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dramatic. Using inductive frame analysis, this article analyzes committee hearings in 
the Senate Foreign Relations and the Armed Services committees in order to identify 
competing narratives defining individual senators’ positions on the ratification of the 
New START. Building on conceptual framework introduced by Walter Russel Mead 
(2002), it distinguishes four schools of thought: Jacksonian, Hamiltonian, Jefferso-
nian, and Wilsonian. The argumentation used in the hearings is deconstructed in order 
to understand the increase in opposition to the traditionally bipartisan nuclear arms 
control regime. The results reveal a factionalism in the Republican Party. The argu-
mentation in opposition to ratification traces back to the Jacksonian school, whereas 
argumentation supporting the ratification traces back to Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian 
and Wilsonian traditions. According to opposition, the Obama administration was 
pursuing its idealistic goal of a world-without-nuclear-weapons and its misguided 
Russia reset policy by any means necessary – most importantly by compromising with 
Russia on U.S. European-based missile defense.
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Introduction
In November 2017 the rising tensions in the Korean peninsula led the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee to hold hearing on “Nuclear Weapons Au-
thority” – first of its kind in four decades (Zengerle, 2017) – and to debate 
the president’s unilateral power to pre-emptively use nuclear weapons, as 
well as the U.S. Congress’ role in this process.1 While the Trump presi-
dency may have raised concerns over the president’s authority to start a 
nuclear war without a congressional declaration of war, the role of the Con-
gress in foreign policy – the constitutional “invitation to struggle” (Corwin, 
1954) over the direction of American foreign policy – is as old as the United 
States. The ratification process of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(The New START) by the United States Congress on 22 December 2010, 
provides a suitable contextual framework for analyzing the deliberational 
aspects of executive-legislative relations in American foreign policy. The 
treaty was a successor to previous bilateral arms control treaties with Rus-
sia, and one of the hallmarks of the Obama administration’s now infamous 
Russia reset policy (see Kuchins, 2011). Despite the strong bipartisan sup-
port for previous agreements, and the bipartisan campaign by former states-
men during the New START ratification process (see Baker et. al, 2010), 
the New START faced strong opposition as 26 Republican senators voted 
against its ratification.2 
At a time when executive agreements had become the method-of-choice 
to conduct foreign affairs (see Krutz & Peake, 2009), the New START was 
ratified as a treaty in the constitutional sense, requiring a two-thirds major-
ity in the Senate (U.S. Const. Art. 2 Sec. II). The Congress had passed the 
Affordable Care Act in a partisan fashion, and the polarization of the Con-
gress along party lines paved way for the Tea Party revolution in the 2010 
midterms. The institutional role of the Senate – passing the New START as 
a treaty instead of a commonly used executive agreement – and the fiercely 
partisan nature of the U.S. Congress following the 2008 and 2010 elec-
tions, combined with the long-term divisions in foreign policy ideology, 
1 This article is based on my doctoral dissertation “Debating Transatlantic Security in the United States 
Congress:A Study of Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees in 111th and 112th Con-
gress (2009-2012),” defended in February 2018.
2 Democrats held the Senate in the 111th Congress by a 56-42 margin, with two Democratic-leaning indepen-
dents leading to de facto Democratic majority of 58-42. Of 42 Republicans only 16 voted for the ratifica-
tion.
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formed the context of the debate. For analytical purposes, this represented a 
unique opportunity to observe – in a methodologically novel manner – the 
ideological features of congressional discourse on a subject of significant 
importance for U.S., European and global security.
This essay analyzes congressional hearings in the Senate Armed Ser-
vices (SASC) and Foreign Relations (SFRC) committees in order to ex-
amine the argumentation made both for and against the ratification of the 
New START, the emphasis being on the argumentation against. It does so 
for the purpose of recognizing competing framings and characterizations. 
Focusing on the ideological aspects in the argumentation, this paper seeks 
to understand why the 2010 New START ratification faced considerably 
stronger congressional opposition than previous strategic arms treaties.3 
This essay quantifies the argumentation used by individual senators, before 
deconstructing the debate based on contextual and historical understanding 
of American foreign policy tradition. In order to identify different ideologi-
cal positions characterizing the deliberations, this article uses Walter Russel 
Mead’s distinction between four schools of American foreign policy tra-
dition: Jacksonians as nationalistic and often rural Republicans, Jefferso-
nians as intellectual constitutionalists of both political parties, Hamiltoni-
ans as commercially-oriented internationalists, and Wilsonians as idealistic 
internationalists (Mead, 2002). Mead’s categorization helps link American 
foreign policy to domestic politics, and thus offers a more comprehensive 
framework for analyzing congressional foreign policy attitudes than tradi-
tional ideological categories in international relations. Qualitative research 
focusing on substantive argumentation is ill-suited for liberal-conservative 
divide commonly used in roll-call based analysis. The goal here is to iden-
tify the ideological foundations of competing narratives of an issue that pre-
viously faced little partisan or ideological opposition. I will use a method 
highlighting the deliberative aspects of foreign policy debate and a theory 
on foreign policy tradition linked to American domestic politics, thus em-
phasizing the interrelatedness of American foreign and domestic politics.4
3 The first treaty (SALT) was negotiated by Richard Nixon and ratified in 1972 by a vote of 88-2, START I 
was ratified by a vote of 93-6 on October 1992, START II by a vote of 87-4 on January 1996, and SORT 
by a vote of 95-0 on March 2003. (See ACA, 2017.)
4 Mead describes his taxonomy as four foreign policy traditions, not as ideology per se. Especially the 
Jacksonian school is defined more as a cultural tradition than a theoretical ideology. The term ideology 
in this article refers to substance-based argumentation used to either oppose or support the START treaty. 
The argumentative logic and the substantive foundation of senator’s position on the issue is then linked to 
Mead’s taxonomy of four schools of American foreign policy tradition.
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Overseers of American Foreign Policy
Congressional committees are the workshops of the Congress. Their im-
portance in legislating, overseeing and investigating has risen due to the 
growing workload of the Congress and the decentralization of congressio-
nal decision-making. They act as “safety valves” and “outlets for national 
debates and controversies” (Davidson et. al. 2011. 176). They also evaluate 
administration policies, promote policy alternatives, identify problems and 
offer solutions (Skinner, 2014. 1-3). The analysis in this article has been 
limited to two committees characterized as the “most visible and conse-
quential overseers of U.S. foreign policy” (Fowler, 2015. 202) – SFRC and 
SASC – although also other committees do influence foreign policy. Ma-
jor foreign policy agencies – the State Department and the Department of 
Defense – fall under congressional oversight of SASC and SFRC. Senate 
committees tend to hold more prestige than their counterparts in the House 
(Fowler, 2015. 4-5), making them ideal locations for analyzing congressio-
nal foreign policy discourse.
Both committees need to balance between electoral realities and institu-
tional responsibilities (Fowler, 2015. 9-10). This has led to the committees 
“furthering the personal and partisan agendas of the members” and being 
“overly sensitive to budgetary politics and routine administration at the ex-
pense of more consequential matters.” (Fowler, 2015. 202; see also Lee, 
2009). Brent Rockman (2005, 35-37) argues, “our national legislators…
have much to lose by investing a great deal of time in complicated foreign 
policy issues.” This makes it less likely for individuals to risk their elector-
al fortunes by abandoning partisan unity. Fowler’s notion of sensitivity to 
budgetary politics is highlighted in the SASC, which is responsible for the 
annual defense appropriations. It is difficult to overestimate the importance 
of the defense appropriations process as during the 111th and 112th Congress 
the U.S. defense budget ranged from $645 billion to $691 billion. Fund-
ing the Pentagon limits reflexive partisanship (Fowler, 2015. 99). Everyone 
wants to partake in bringing home the bacon, and SASC is likely to engage 
itself in budgetary hearings with distributional consequences (e.g. David-
son et. al., 2011; Mayhew, 2000; 2004). In SFRC the role of budgetary 
politics is less visible, making the committee prone to ideological conflict 
due to its deliberative nature and institutional responsibility over divisive 
issues like U.S. foreign aid (Fowler, 2015).
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Foreign Policy Ideology in the Congressional Context
Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley (2015) postulate two features affecting 
congressional foreign policy behavior: distributional and ideological.5 The 
New START included both; the nuclear modernization aspect had distri-
butional consequences, and the general U.S. nuclear arms policy was de-
bated on ideological basis. Overall, presidents have more difficulty passing 
policies when “distribution of gains and losses is large and concentrated.” 
(Milner & Tingley, 2015. 39). When the distributional features of a policy 
are high, special interests are activated and parochial interests of individual 
lawmakers are highlighted. The higher the distributional effects, the higher 
the domestic restraints on president’s policies. Nuclear modernization fits 
in the category of domestic military spending invoking heightened congres-
sional activity (Milner & Tingley, 2015. 42-51). Ideological considerations 
affect the lawmakers’ foreign policy position, and ideology shapes the for-
eign policy instruments (i.e. policies) they believe lead to the desired policy 
outcomes. According to Milner & Tingley (2015. 57), “they [the public] 
have different causal stories in their heads about how policies connect to 
outcomes.” Individuals might perceive enhancing national security as the 
desired policy outcome but disagree fundamentally on how the U.S. nuclear 
arms policy ought to be conducted to reach the agreed-upon goal – in the 
case of the New START, unilateralism versus international nonprolifera-
tion framework. 
To frame is to make the “causal links” salient, and to “promote a par-
ticular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation…” (Ent-
man, 1993. 52). In Congress, the ideological divide becomes salient when 
Congress is divided in its policy response. Calculating ideological effects in 
Congress is complicated by the ambiguity between ideological polarization 
and partisan conflict – the idea of ideological purity against the self-serving 
interests of politicians placating their voter base.6
Instead of analyzing a liberal-conservative divide, this article adopts 
Walter Russel Mead’s distinction of four distinct schools of American for-
eign policy tradition; Jacksonian, Jeffersonian, Hamiltonian, and Wilsonian 
5 Ideology in this article is understood in Gerring’s definition (see 1997), as a consistent approach to specific 
issues over time.
6 See Lee’s (2009, 3) rather parochial view: “Congressional parties hold together and battle with one another 
because of powerful competing political interests, not just because of members’ ideals or ideological pref-
erences.”
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(Mead, 2002). Hamiltonians can be described as globalists, who define 
America’s interests primarily in economic terms, yet value America’s in-
volvement in the global arena as the leader of the “free world” and suc-
cessor of Great Britain. International economic system created after World 
War II and George H. W. Bush’s “new world order” and his argumentation 
justifying the Gulf War aptly exemplifies the Hamiltonian school. Wilso-
nians are globalists who define America’s interests in terms of values. U.S. 
foreign policy highlighting international framework, human rights, democ-
racy, and rule-of-law has its roots in a Wilsonian tradition, exemplified by 
the support for humanitarian interventions, such as U.S. involvement in the 
Balkans. 
Jeffersonians are the so-called “realists” of the four schools. They per-
ceive risk-aversion as the first rule of U.S. foreign policy and see foreign 
entanglements as harmful for American democracy at home. International 
framework is positive when it reduces risks of war – such as international 
nuclear arms control agreements – yet Jeffersonians believe in the constitu-
tional practice of America’s foreign policy (i.e. war powers question). 
Jacksonians – often coming from rural areas – are the most vehemently 
nationalist and populist, and the foreign policy ideology for them is more of 
an instinct than a well-thought ideology. They support military, social secu-
rity and Medicaid, but see the role of federal government as mainly harmful 
and intrusive. For them the United States is a nation state based on blood 
and ethnicity, rather than on abstract ideals. International organizations are 
viewed with suspicion, and unilateralism is encouraged. Limited warfare, 
humanitarian interventions and foreign aid are strongly opposed. In gener-
al, Hamiltonians and Wilsonians – the so-called east coast elite – took con-
trol of the American foreign policy from 1945 until the election of George 
W. Bush in 2000. George W. Bush began as a Jacksonian, Barrack Obama 
as a Jeffersonian, and finally Donald Trump as a Jacksonian. In partisan 
terms, Jacksonians are almost exclusively Republicans, Jeffersonians both 
left-leaning Democrats and libertarian Republicans, Hamiltonians primar-
ily Republicans, and Wilsonians Democrats (see Mead, 2002; 2004; 2017).
Executive-legislative relations in foreign policy are a much-studied sub-
ject. Some scholars have observed increased presidential authority, call-
ing it the imperial presidency (see Schlesinger, 1974; Rudalevige 2006a; 
2006b; 2012; 2016; Bose, 2011), some congressional assertiveness (see 
Carter & Scott; 2009; Hersman, 2000; Howell & Pevehouse, 2005; 2007a; 
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2007b; Lindsay, 1993; 1994; Owens, 2009), and some argue the Congress 
has knowingly deferred its constitutional authority (see Fisher, 2004; 2005; 
2009; 2010; 2012; 2015 & 2017, Fisher, Hendrickson & Weissman, 2008). 
Some have seen congressional motivations as parochial by nature (see Lee, 
2009; Rockman, 2005; 2012), some based on domestic politics ideology 
(see Gries, 2014; Mead, 2002; 2017), and some see variance depending on 
foreign policy instrument (see Milner & Tingley, 2015).
Research Design
Methodologically, this study employed inductive framing analysis of SASC 
and SFRC hearings on the ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduc-
tion Treaty in the 111th Congress (2009-2010).7 By analyzing the hearings 
transcripts statement by statement, question by question, the goal was to 
identify frames, as well as logical framing devices and reasoning devices 
that promote a certain interpretation of a topic (Berbers et al. 2015. 802).8 
Congressional response to a problem is dependent on the congressional 
understanding of the problem, i.e. problem definition. According to Debo-
rah Stone (1989, 282), problem definition is a: ”process of image making, 
where the images have to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame 
and responsibility.” Congressional committees have a role in defining prob-
lems by setting the agenda and organizing hearings on selected issues. The 
public nature of congressional hearings makes them a suitable arena to 
create causal stories and to fight to defend and sustain specific interpreta-
tions of reality (Stone, 1989. 293) by framing the debate. Framing refers 
to “arguments and justifications embedded in political discourse” (Kinder 
& Nelson, 2005. 103), with the goal of making complex realities acces-
sible for the people by creating “…cognitive structures that help citizens 
make sense of politics” (ibid) through political discourse. How individual 
senators made sense of the complex realities of the New START treaty to 
promote their interpretation thereof represents the leading question in this 
article. Presenting issues like the New START to a wide audience in com-
prehensible terms links domestic politics to complex foreign policy issues. 
As argued by Peter Gries (2014) and Mead (2002), foreign policy beliefs 
7 Not that the purpose here is not to conduct a rhetorical study, but a substantive reading of the argumentation 
used.
8 Available at Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov.
56 American Studies in Scandinavia, 51:2
are closely linked to one’s domestic policy views, and as noted by Quentin 
Skinner (2002, 5), “…what it is rational to believe depends in large measure 
on the nature of our other beliefs.”
According to Robert Entman (1993. 52), attempts to frame the debate 
can be identified by “the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock 
phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that 
provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements.” Once the 
arguments were identified, I analyzed both the competing and dominant 
frames. The quantitative presentation of the results further divided the ar-
guments in two columns based on whether the senator behind individual 
frame voted against or for the ratification (see figures 1 & 2). Inductive 
analysis has been criticized for too small of a sample size and difficulties in 
replicating the results (see de Vreese, 2005. 53; Hertog & Mcleod, 2011). To 
counter possible biases, first, the argumentative logic of frames identified 
was deconstructed. Second, specific criteria to identify and categorize state-
ments into framings was established: the reading of the debates recognized 
mutually exclusive framings (such as missile defense negative and missile 
defense positive) labeled as competing frames, and frames frequently used 
by both sides of the debate (such as national security), labeled as dominant 
frames (D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010). Third, Claes de Vreese (2005, 54) 
set four criteria to analyze frames: 1) identifiable conceptual and linguistic 
characteristics, 2) frames must be commonly observed, 3) frame must be 
reliably distinguishable, and 4) have representational validity. Overall, the 
research methodology used in the article can be summarized as follows:
1) Examination of the political, historical, ideological, and institutional 
context.
2) Recognition of dominant and competing framings. 
3) Recognition of key players and competing factions.
4) Deconstruction of the debate in context.
Deconstruction of the Debate
SFRC held nine hearings devoted to the new Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty, whereas the SASC held five (S. Hrg. 111-779 & S. Hrg. 111-897). 
Senators in the SFRC were considerably more likely to support the ratifica-
tion; out of 278 framings identified, 240 were statements made by senators 
57OPPOSING THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY IN THE U.S. CONGRESS
voting for the ratification, whereas 38 framings were statements made by 
senators arguing against the ratification (see figure 1). Senators in the SASC 
were much more likely to oppose the ratification. Of the 138 framings iden-
tified, 77 were identified in statements by senators voting against the treaty, 
61 in those voting for it (see figure 2)
9 
 
9 MD Negative: Statements arguing that ratifying START would have negative consequences for U.S. mis-
sile defense.
 MD Positive: Statements arguing that the New START does not affect U.S. missile defense.   
Verification Positive: Statements arguing that verification regime in would enhance U.S. security. 
 Verification Negative: Statements arguing that verification regime would either be detrimental to U.S. 
security or that U.S. has no reason to trust Russia in the matter. 
 NPT / Arms Control: Statements arguing for importance of ratification to overall nuclear nonproliferation.
 National Security: Statements arguing START’s effects on national security.
 European Security: Statements stressing START’s implications to European security.
 Military / Strategic: Arguments based on military / strategic implications.
 Bipartisan / Water’s Edge: Statements arguing START’s ratification is a bipartisan matter.
 Partisan / Administration: Statements arguing that other side’s argumentation is based on partisanship 
rather than U.S. interests.
 Congress / Process: Statements arguing the role of U.S. Congress in the overall legislative process.
 Iran & North Korea: Statements arguing for or against the treaty based on threat by Iran and North Korea.
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Competing Frames
Missile defense negative -framing was the dominant argument of the op-
position. In the SFRC it constituted 37% of all the arguments against, in the 
SASC 25% (see figures 1 & 2). Argumentatively statements identified with-
in the framing emphasized negative consequences to the American missile 
defense infrastructure in Europe, and the Obama administration’s decision 
to cancel the Bush-era ground-based missile defense system in Europe was 
presented as an appeasement to Russia. In other words, the Obama admin-
istration was granting Russia a veto power over American missile defense:
I continue to have serious concerns about why the administration agreed to this lan-
guage in the treaty text, after telling Congress repeatedly during the negotiations that 
they would do no such thing, and I fear it could fuel Russia’s clear desire to establish 
unfounded linkages between offensive and defensive weapons. […] I would reiterate my 
long-held view that any notion of a Russian veto power over decisions on our missile 
defense architecture is unacceptable, and we should oppose any attempts by any admin-
istration to do so (Senator McCain (R-AZ), S. Hrg. 111-779, 2010. 4).
The argument made by SASC Chairman John McCain (R-AZ) demon-
strated the logic of Republican opposition. It established a negative link 
between the New START and the 2009 decision to cancel U.S. missile de-
fense plans in Poland and Czech Republic. It also critiqued the negotiating 
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process, which, according to McCain, included misleading the Congress. 
Granting Russia veto over missile defense – or any other issue for that mat-
ter – is framed as an appeasement to the Russian federation. Thereby the 
missile defense negative -framing was closely linked to partisan / adminis-
tration and Congress / process -framings, prevalent in the SASC (figure 2). 
The “language in the treaty text” Senator McCain referred to is the legally 
nonbinding signing statement by the Russian side, which claimed that the 
treaty “…can operate and be viable only if the United States of America 
refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities…” (Woolf, 2016. 
15). Although the signing statement itself was not legally binding (see 
Woolf, 2016), McCain’s statement implied de facto understanding between 
presidents Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev. Such agreement – legally 
binding or not – was unacceptable.
Besides the negative consequences to America’s freedom of action as 
a sovereign actor in Europe, McCain delegitimized the Russian “desire to 
establish unfounded linkages between offensive and defensive weapons.” 
Denying the legitimacy of the Russian assertion that U.S. missile defense 
would affect the strategic balance vis-à-vis European security setting sug-
gested that such calculations should not form the basis of U.S. assessment 
of the situation. The limited missile defense systems the U.S. was planning 
formed a regional system against limited ballistic missile launches (for ex-
ample Kelleher & Peter, 2015. 1). Besides the Bush-era plans to deploy 
ground-based missiles to Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic 
were meant to deter limited missile attacks from Iran (Acton, 2015. 37-38). 
McCain’s argumentation suggested that the ten interceptors deployed in 
Poland under Bush administration’s plan would not affect the strategic bal-
ance vis-à-vis Russia.10
Senator James DeMint (R-SC) challenged the logic of mutually assured 
destruction (MAD). In his view, the New START would continue the logic 
of MAD and establish as U.S. policy not to develop missile defense ca-
pabilities that “could shoot down multiple missiles…” (Senator DeMint 
(R-SC), S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 236). DeMint further argued that this un-
derstanding of U.S. missile defense policy had been made clear to Rus-
sia, even though the American people would find it objectionable that the 
United States would not attempt to “use our technology to develop a sys-
tem that could not only protect us against the Soviet Union but multiple 
10 Russia was estimated having 2,000 operationally deployed tactical nuclear missiles deployed on its west-
ern border (Zenko, 2010. 7-8).
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missiles from China or some other nation that was capable of developing 
multiple systems.” (ibid.). For DeMint, the question was of great strategic 
significance. United States as the one true superpower with an enormous 
economic edge relative to Russia ought not to limit its policy based on 
the MAD doctrine. United States was “a protector of many and a threat to 
none”, whereas Russia was a “a protector of none and a threat to many…”, 
the many including American allies in Europe: “Over 30 countries count on 
us.” (Senator DeMint (R-SC) S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 385). If the debate in 
Congress on missile defense and nuclear arms ranged from a comprehen-
sive missile defense layer to voices arguing for the technical and fiscal im-
possibility of such systems (see Gallagher, 2015. 94), DeMint supported the 
idea of pursuing the strategic mindset behind Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars”; 
the opposite of the framework established by the New START. Given the 
post-Cold War strength of America’s strategic and economic position, the 
United States ought to push its advantage, argued DeMint, rather than con-
cede to second tier powers by considering symmetric nuclear arms reduc-
tions automatically positive.
Missile Defense positive -framing was a reactive response to the opposi-
tion. In both committees, missile defense positive ranked amongst the most 
frequently invoked framings (see figure 1 and 2).
Fundamentally, this treaty is a treaty that limits strategic offensive nuclear arms. It does 
not limit anything else. Some might want it to limit more. Some might fear that it does 
limit more. But it does not. For instance, there have been statements made suggesting that 
the treaty imposes constraints on our missile defense plans and programs. That is simply 
incorrect (Senator Levin (D-MI), S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 35).
Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) denied the linkages between offensive and 
defensive weapons. In his view, the treaty did not limit defensive systems, 
despite Russia’s desires. The unilateral signing statement by Russia was 
based on the false premise that U.S. missile defense would alter the stra-
tegic balance between Russia and the U.S., thus delegitimizing assertions 
made by Russians. According to Levin, the U.S. did not acknowledge the 
linkage between offensive and defensive weapons – in the New START 
context – and thus assertion that ratifying the New START would constrain 
U.S. missile defense was “simply incorrect” (ibid). 
Whereas Levin’s argumentation relied on delegitimizing Russia’s con-
cerns and refuting Republican arguments that secret deals were made to 
obtain Russian approval of the treaty, the SFRC Ranking Member Richard 
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Lugar (R-IN) went a step further. Lugar questioned the overall feasibility 
of a national missile defense system capable of altering the logic of MAD. 
According to Lugar, neither Russia nor America had at any time “seriously 
discussed creating a sufficient missile defense that would stop several thou-
sands of missiles…” (Senator Lugar (R-IN) S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 240). 
Referring to arguments made by some Republicans, Lugar argued that a 
policy pursuing unrealistic missile defense system would be “as wild as it 
can be and no really a part…of any serious talk about arms control.” (ibid, 
381). Following Lugar’s argumentation, the advocates of “wild” missile 
defense policy at the expense of ratifying the New START were either act-
ing outside the sphere of rationality, or simply motivated by factors other 
than reality-based calculations. Lugar suggested that opposition to the New 
START based on its supposed limitations to the U.S. missile defense was 
based on domestic calculations: “If this treaty somehow inhibits in any way 
the defense of our country and accepts or ensures mutually assured destruc-
tion…” – as suggested by fellow Republicans like Senators McCain and 
DeMint – “…that becomes a rather volatile message that somehow or other 
we were derelict in our duties, myopic with regard to the world in which we 
are” (Senator Lugar (R-IN) S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 240).
The international arms control regime was another visible point of con-
tention. The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its viability formed a core 
argumentative framework for senators supporting the ratification. This line 
was more salient in the SFRC (42 NPT / Arms control regime -framings) 
than in the SASC (8 framings) (figure 1 & 2). The argumentative logic was 
simple; ratifying and implementing a New Strategic Arms Reduction Trea-
ty would further the global grand strategy of nuclear non-proliferation and 
arms control. Chairman Levin described his view in his opening statement 
during a New START hearing: “…each nation clearly has more weapons 
than needed […] proliferation threat is real and includes the possibility that 
nuclear weapons and materials could fall into the hands of terrorists or oth-
ers who wish to threaten the use of or use nuclear materials” (Senator Levin 
(D-MI), S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 2-3). According to Levin, ratifying the New 
START did not diminish the effectiveness of American nuclear arsenals, and 
the ratification answered the more critical threat against American national 
security, i.e. the proliferation of nuclear arms. Two key elements of the NPT 
/ Arms control regime -framing were evident in Levin’s statement; bilateral 
arms control with Russia and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
to terrorists. The third element was the global nuclear non-proliferation re-
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gime. According to Republican Senator Lugar, the treaty “…addresses our 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, obligations, and therefore assists 
in gaining cooperation from other countries on key nonproliferation priori-
ties…”, and thus “helps strengthen broader United States-Russia coopera-
tion, which is important in responding to proliferation challenges from Iran 
and North Korea” (Senator Lugar (R-IN) S. Hrg. 2010. 343). Both Demo-
crats and Republicans voting for the ratification highlighted the importance 
of institutionalized international nuclear non-proliferation regime as a key 
element of American national security, a notion that remained unchallenged 
within the NPT / Arms control regime -framing – only one statement by 
senators voting against the ratification was identified (figure 1 & 2).
Senators supportive of the treaty made several statements stressing the 
bipartisan nature of arms control, constituting the Bipartisan (water’s edge) 
-framing (figure 1). This argument reminded that previous arms control 
agreements were reached by a bipartisan consensus over the benefits of 
international agreements limiting both American and Russian nuclear arse-
nals. Given the bipartisan nature of the issue, the treaty should have been 
considered as a national security issue – wherein politics stop at the wa-
ter’s edge – as opposed to a domestic politics issue defined by partisan-
ship. Because highly regarded Republicans have supported efforts to limit 
U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals, current opposition must not have its roots in 
national security, but parochial domestic politics considerations. As Chair-
man John Kerry noted; “…it was Ronald Reagan who began negotiations 
on the original START treaty, and George H.W. Bush completed them. That 
treaty was approved with the overwhelming support of Democrats” (Sena-
tor Kerry (D-MA) S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 2). According to Kerry, this was a 
continuum of a policy initiated by an iconic Republican Ronald Reagan and 
pushed forward by George H.W. Bush. Despite possible differences of opin-
ion, Democrats supported the Republican efforts, and Republicans ought to 
have followed the advice of their own. And if Republican presidents did 
not convince those suspicious of the New START, references were made 
to an op-ed published by prominent Republicans Henry Kissinger, George 
Shultz, James Baker and Colin Powell, which claimed that “it is, however, 
in the national interest to ratify New START” (The Washington Post, 2010).
Republicans opposing the ratification did not challenge the bipartisan 
history of arms control agreements. They did not engage in significant de-
bates over the value of past agreements or attempt to challenge the author-
ity of Republican statesmen of the past. Instead, the Congress / process 
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-framing (figure 1 & 2) postulated that the process by which the treaty was 
pushed through the Congress was biased. Committees could not engage in 
meaningful debates because only witnesses supportive of the ratification 
were invited to the hearings. Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) argued that all 
the 17 witnesses invited by the SASC and the SFRC were supportive of the 
treaty; “I don’t know who thinks that can be reasonable, because it’s not” 
(Senator Inhofe (R-OK) S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 354). Furthermore, the par-
tisan / administration -framing argued that the whole idea behind the New 
START was to promote the Obama administration’s leftist agenda with the 
end-goal of a nuclear free world. This notion was not necessarily unfair as 
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review by the Department of Defense did con-
clude that one of the key objectives of U.S. nuclear policy was “reducing 
the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national strategy” (Department of 
Defense, 2010. iii). This notion of the administration’s preferences made 
opposing Republicans like Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) wary: “I think this 
administration has a progressive, leftist aversion to national missile defense 
and to nuclear deterrence. They don’t like it, emotionally and otherwise. 
That vision, I think, is affecting policy, and it causes me to be uneasy” 
(Senator Sessions (R-AL) S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 313). According to Ses-
sions, not only was the process itself rigged but the entire endeavor was 
given a highly ideological overtone by framing it as “leftist” policy based 
on “emotionally” charged perceptions of American nuclear arms policy.
Dominant Frames
National Security and military / strategic -framings constituted dominant 
framings of the issue. In terms of framing theory, national security and its 
relation to both military / strategic and Iran / North Korea framings can 
be explained by the strength of the thematic framing of nuclear policy and 
overall security policy in a broader context (Schnell & Callaghan, 2005. 
4-5). For an argument to be perceived as legitimate, it needs to satisfy the 
requirements of a broader concept of national security. The ratification of 
the New START and the military / strategic implications for national secu-
rity formed a strong generic frame (Schnell & Callaghan, 2005. 6), which 
had the capability to “transcend issue, time, and space limits” (de Vreese 
et al. 2001, 109). In short, regardless of the issue, the pros and cons of a 
specific policy proposal were defended or opposed by its implications to 
national security. National security set the limits for the debate. In terms of 
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the New START, both sides invoked national security, military / strategic 
and Iran / North Korea -framings (figure 1 & 2). The logic of military / 
strategic -framing was rather simple; those opposing the ratification argued 
that the Obama administration was ideologically opposed to nuclear arms, 
and thus had suspicions over the administration’s willingness to commit 
to nuclear modernization.11 These sentiments were echoed by Senator Jeff 
Sessions: “The only problem is that if the President had his way, the three 
of you [American nuclear weapons scientists working at a nuclear weap-
ons research facility and who were witnesses at the hearing] wouldn’t have 
jobs because he wants no nuclear weapons” (Senator Sessions (R-AL) S. 
Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 148). According to Sessions, President Obama had a 
personal conviction to rid the world of nuclear weapons, and he would be 
willing to compromise nuclear modernization – and consequently Ameri-
can national security – to achieve his ideological objectives.
As stated before, this was not a completely inaccurate notion, although 
it distorted the stated goals of the Obama administration. In the administra-
tion’s 2010 National Security Strategy document, U.S. nuclear strategy was 
to “[invest] in the modernization of a safe, secure, and effective stockpile 
without the production of new nuclear weapons” (White House, 2010. 23). 
The Nuclear Posture Review called for “maintaining strategic deterrence 
and stability at reduced nuclear force levels” (Department of Defense, 
2010. iii). So, from a specific perspective of America’s investment in its 
nuclear weapons infrastructure, the stated goal was to do “more with less,” 
which was interpreted by parts of the Republican party as a substantial 
shift in the American nuclear arms policy. In the end, President Obama did 
commit to nuclear modernization by investing approximately $185 billion 
over the decade to upgrade or replace nuclear submarines, create nuclear 
capable bomber and fighter aircraft, and update nuclear bombs, missiles 
and warheads (Lieber & Press, 2011). In Europe, the Obama administra-
tion made the decision to modernize European tactical nuclear weapons 
(Borger, 2015).
The argumentation for the treaty painted a different picture. Vis-à-vis the 
threat posed by Iranian and North Korean ambitions to pursue nuclear arms, 
not-signing the treaty would have had severe implications to the interna-
11 See for example: “…major concern for me has been this issue of modernization and, in particular, the com-
mitment not just of this administration but a commitment of Congress to put the dollars in place to make 
sure that we have the capability to modernize” (Senator Chambliss (R-AL), S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 320.)
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tional NPT regime and thus hinder the global effort to curb both Iranian 
and North Korean ambitions. This was not simply a Democratic notion. 
The Ranking Member Lugar (R-IN) noted that the treaty “…addresses our 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, obligations, and therefore assists 
in gaining cooperation from other countries on key nonproliferation pri-
orities…,” which in turn “…helps strengthen broader United States-Russia 
cooperation, which is important in responding to proliferation challenges 
from Iran and North Korea” (Senator Lugar (R-IN) S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 
343). Thus, according to Lugar, the treaty strengthened the U.S. position 
regarding agreed-upon threats against U.S. interests, namely the so-called 
“rogue states” Iran and North Korea. The global security benefits of the 
ratification were not lost to Democrats either, as Senator Russ Feingold 
inquired “should we be concerned about the kind of message we’d send to 
other nations, for example Iran, about the United States-Russian ability to 
work together on nonproliferation concerns if we failed to ratify a treaty 
that brings mutual security benefits?” (Senator Feingold (D-MI) S. Hrg. 
111-738, 2010. 16).
Against the foreign policy establishment – Jacksonian opposition to the 
New START
Previous treaties limiting strategic nuclear arms between the two nuclear-
superpowers were introduced and ratified on bipartisan basis. In the 111th 
Congress 26 out of 100 senators decided to vote against the New START 
introduced by President Obama, all those senators being Republicans. This 
development is surprising in the context of previous similar treaties. In 
2003, George W. Bush passed the New START’s predecessor the Strategic 
Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) through the Senate by 95-0. Of the 26 
Republicans voting against the treaty in 2010, 15 voted for SORT in 2003 
(Pifer, 2013). Why the difference? Based on the argumentative breakdown 
of the relevant committee hearings, I would argue that the New START 
treaty – like many foreign policy decisions – ought to not be seen in the 
context of the treaty’s substantive merits, but in the partisan context high-
lighting the existing ideological divisions in the United States Congress. 
Despite the efforts by the Democrats and some Republicans to compare 
the New START with the previous bipartisan framework of nuclear arms 
reductions, the New START reflected the factional nature of the Repub-
lican Party already evident in previous treaties limiting weapons of mass 
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destruction. Thus, rather than comparing the New START to the previous 
START or SORT agreements, it’s congressional reception reflected that of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) signed by George H.W. Bush 
in 1993 but ratified in 1997 by a vote of 74-26 (Krutz et al. 2009. 137-138). 
The CWC, as well as for example the 1999 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT), demonstrated the factional nature of Senate Republicans, as the 
GOP was divided into internationalists voting for the treaties, and unilat-
eralists voting against. The unilateralists’ ideological opposition is largely 
based on “a radical hostility of unilateralists to national defense through 
treaties.” (Deibel, 2005. 86-87).
These unilateralists can be identified in Mead’s terms as Jacksonians. In 
the Congress, the Jacksonian forces were active in breaking down the arms 
control regime put in place with the Soviet Union by fighting the ratifica-
tion of international agreements and actively pushing for the adoption of a 
national missile defense system (Mead, 2002. 290-291). Jacksonians were 
also pushing back on what they saw as concessions to the Soviet Union dur-
ing the Cold War (Mead, 2002. 297). Appeasing the vastly weakened Rus-
sia by agreeing on nuclear parity – in an international framework – was the 
continuation of a strategy opposed by the Jacksonian faction of the Repub-
lican Party. During the New START debates, this idea was demonstrated by 
the dominance of missile defense negative -framing, which was the most 
salient point of contention among the opposing Republicans (figure 1 & 
2). The Jacksonians did support the globalist Cold War strategy due to the 
necessities imposed by an existential security threat, but the end of the Cold 
War revealed a chasm between the Hamiltonian and Wilsonian globalism 
and Jacksonian nationalism (Mead, 2002. 298). The development which led 
to the stronger-than-expected opposition to the New START was already 
evident in the 1990’s when Jacksonians such as the SFRC Chairman Jesse 
Helms (R-NC) reactively opposed President Clinton’s Hamiltonian / Wil-
sonian foreign policy agenda by holding detested arms control agreements 
as a political hostage for conservative reforms (Krutz et al. 2009. 137-138). 
Like in the late 1990’s, the opposition strategy was to emphasize the de-
fense against nuclear threats (national missile defense system) rather than 
to attempt affect the international arena through agreements (nonprolifera-
tion regime) (see Deibel, 2002).12 
During President Obama’s first term, the administration seemed to push 
12 The question of national missile defense system has always been highly ideological: “…the debate over 
missile defense is often mired in ideology more than it is grounded in real fact” (O’Hanlon, 2009).
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for policies in direct opposition to the policies supported by congressional 
Republicans of late 1990’s and early 2000’s. President Obama announced 
the cancellation of the Bush era plans for a ground-based missile defense 
system in Europe, continued by a “leftist” – and naïve – nuclear strategy 
highlighting idealistic goals over concrete security concerns. The results 
of this study reveal that the dominance of missile defense negative – and 
partisan / administration -framings in statements and the argumentative 
logic of individual statements –  made by senators opposing the treaty were 
evidence of an ideological opposition following the Jacksonian school.
The New START was supported by the Democratic Party and a faction 
of the Republicans. But to conclude that the support came from a bipartisan 
faction coined as internationalists or globalists would be misleading. For 
example, Terry Deibel (2005. 94) categorized John McCain as a Repub-
lican internationalist based on his voting behavior in the Senate, and John 
McCain was one of the strongest Republican supporters of the U.S. military 
operations in Libya (CNN, 2011). Yet McCain was very vocal in his opposi-
tion to the ratification of New START and based much of his argumentation 
on missile defense negative -framing. On the other hand, Richard Lugar 
was also categorized as a Republican internationalist by Deibel (2005. 94), 
and he was a strong advocate of the New START. Lugar was strongly op-
posed to U.S. military intervention in Libya (Rogin, 2011). This is where 
the globalist / nationalist or internationalist / isolationist divide falls short. 
Both Lugar and McCain were certainly globalists or internationalist – Mc-
Cain perhaps with a unilateralist streak – yet their views differed starkly on 
Libya and the New START. Mead’s (2002) division between Jeffersonians 
and Jacksonians seemed to better explain the difference between the two 
Republicans. Lugar’s argumentation was consistent with Mead’s Jefferso-
nian school. In Jeffersonian thought, the national missile defense system 
championed by Jacksonian Republicans was a great example of wasteful 
military spending and even harmful to America’s security interests (Mead, 
2002. 302). For Jacksonians, missile defense system such as Reagan’s fa-
mous “Strategic Defense Initiative” was the Holy Grail (Mead, 2002. 303). 
It could establish the United States as the sole military hegemony on the 
planet, as it had the edge of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Jeffer-
sonians see international arms control agreements as a tool to combat the 
adverse effects of nuclear arms and nuclear proliferation, whereas Jackso-
nians see such limitations as harmful for the U.S. interests. This Jacksonian 
logic manifested itself in the early stages of George W. Bush presidency 
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as his administration withdrew from international agreements such as the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to pursue the long-awaited national missile 
defense system. Jacksonian war doctrine demands unconditional surrender 
from America’s enemies (Mead, 2002. 259). The end of Cold War was anti-
climactic for Jacksonian Americans, and now that Russia was no longer 
the existential threat it had been during the Cold War, the U.S. ought to 
pursue its hegemony regardless of Russian opposition. Voluntarily drawing 
down the U.S. nuclear arsenals would only weaken America’s position in 
the world, as articulated by Senator Sessions (R-AL): “One of the problems 
we have is that as we draw down our weapons, it seems to me that China 
may have an incentive to seek equivalence with the United States, nuclear 
parity with the United States, as might other countries, frankly” (Senator 
Sessions (R-AL) S.Hrg. 112-228, 2011. 16).
Opposition to the New START continued the congressional post-Cold 
War dynamic of the Republican opposition to international agreements 
built in a bipartisan manner during the Cold War. This dynamic was estab-
lished by the Republican takeover of the House in 1994 and the increas-
ingly partisan nature of the institution under leadership of Republicans 
such as Newt Gingrich (see Dionne, Mann & Ornstein, 2017) and Jesse 
Helms. In Mead’s terms, the Jacksonian school of thought was on the rise 
in the Congress, wherein the Jacksonian tendencies of the population are 
overrepresented due to the unique features of American political system. 
Mead’s categorization falls short if one tries to categorize individuals into 
neat ideologically or intellectually coherent categories, and that much he 
admits himself (Mead, 2002. 95). In this context, Mead’s distinction does 
separate the populist Jacksonian school opposing the ratification and the 
foreign policy elites of the three other schools who supported it. In terms of 
political parties, the Republican Party’s factionalism became evident.
Conclusion
The argument that the Obama administration was pursuing its “leftist” goal 
of a world-without-nuclear-weapons by any means necessary formed the 
core opposing argument against the ratification of the New START. The 
administration was seemingly prepared to compromise its missile defense 
capabilities in Europe in order to appease Russia and promote Obama ad-
ministration’s Russia reset policy. To explain the dominance of missile de-
fense negative -framing in opposing the New START, one must understand 
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the characteristics of the Jacksonian school. According to the Jacksonian 
opposition to, the cause, blame, and responsibility for deteriorating Ameri-
ca’s national security by ratifying a treaty harmful to America’s national in-
terests was placed on the Obama administration and the idealistic ideology 
motivating it. According to the Jacksonian opposition, United States ought 
to have pushed its military advantage by abandoning the logic of mutually 
assured destruction and taking America’s place as the global military hege-
mony. Parity in terms of nuclear capabilities did not serve the U.S. inter-
ests, as they were defined by the opposing faction of the Republican Party. 
The narrative was straightforward; the Obama administration, motivated 
by a leftist, globalist ideology was ready to compromise America’s core 
interests to pursue its idealistic goals. In the face of America’s traditional 
foe – Russia – the Obama administration was weak. Although the nuclear 
modernization played a considerable role, the framing of the New START 
created was based on the juxtaposition between the foreign policy elite and 
the Jacksonian understanding of America’s national security interests.
The Trump presidency and the political forces behind the movement 
that won him the election follow closely the Jacksonian tradition defin-
ing the opposition to the New START. A comprehensive understanding of 
the American foreign policy and the domestic dynamics affecting congres-
sional decision-making processes is required to understand the competing 
ideas battling over American relationship with the rest of the world. The 
foreign policy elite behind the post-World War II strategy was challenged 
during the New START process by a foreign policy tradition different from 
the globalist ideas of both Republican and Democratic Hamiltonians and 
Wilsonians. In fact, the factionalism of the Republican Party evident in the 
debates has since been eroded by the rising hyper-polarization restricting 
the individual senators’ ability to agree with the opposition, much like Sen-
ator Lugar did during the debates analyzed in this article. Given the great 
influence of America’s foreign policy on the rest of the world, a study of the 
deliberative side of congressional politics is needed to explain the ideas and 
beliefs at the foundation of American politics. Study of foreign policy elites 
and presidential remarks leave us with an incomplete picture; the beliefs 
and ideas defining American public opinion affect America’s foreign policy 
through the Congress.
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